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Reaching Out to the Third World: 
East Germany’s Anti-Apartheid and socialist human rights campaign* 
 
In 1985, Desmond Tutu complained in an interview with the West German magazine Der 
Spiegel that ‘everyone, who is against Apartheid, is labelled a communist in South Africa’.1 
The Anglican bishop hoped to dispel Western fears of a communist take-over of South Africa 
in case the African National Congress (ANC) would overthrow the current regime. To make 
this point, he argued that the US, UK, France and other European countries had also accepted 
an alliance with the Soviet Union to defeat Nazi Germany. ‘The West did not turn communist 
just because it fought together with Russia against National Socialism. Why is it that it is 
always claimed that our people would turn communist only because it accepts aid from 
wherever it comes?’ Tutu instead saw the fight against Apartheid as a struggle for human 
rights. Yet, if the Western world perceived this struggle as a communist endeavour then his 
people might just have to conclude that ‘the enemy of your enemy is your friend’.2 The ANC 
had developed strong ties to socialist countries from the 1950s and 60s onwards, among them 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). By speaking to a leading West German political 
magazine, Tutu reached out to a Western audience in advocating the Christian and human 
rights cause of his personal struggle against Apartheid. Implicitly, he also criticised states 
such as the Federal Republic, which had left the ANC little choice in choosing its allies by 
retaining economic ties to the South African regime. 
 West German suspicions of a close connection of the ANC to the socialist bloc 
therefore were not unfounded.3 The anti-Apartheid movement had begun as a rights protest 
for self-determination. Yet, the ANC’s turn to militancy brought their struggle in contact with 
Third World liberation ideology and socialist bloc countries after the end of the Second 
World War.4 In the 1950s and 60s, many Western countries such as the UK and the Federal 
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Republic refused to endorse the anti-Apartheid struggle openly. The ANC became an 
attractive partner for East German leaders as their turn to militancy coincided with a 
fundamental shift in the East Berlin regime’s foreign policy. The SED leadership planned to 
establish East Germany as a sovereign country in international affairs. The right of self-
determination, put front and centre by Third World leaders in the 1950s and early 60s had 
much to offer to bolster East German claims to legal sovereignty over the GDR’s territorial 
integrity and internal affairs.  
 The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 marked the official departure of the SED 
leadership from all-German policies. Party ideologues now prepared the break from German 
national tradition and the establishment of the GDR as a sovereign socialist country in the 
international arena.5 For too long, the SED leadership contended, the West German 
government had isolated the GDR in international affairs. To break the Hallstein Doctrine, 
through which the Bonn government threatened countries with the immediate severing of all 
economic and political ties if they acknowledged the GDR’s sovereignty, the SED leaders 
needed new allies. They decided that they would only find them among newly decolonised 
countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In highlighting the anti-fascist foundations of 
the East German state, the SED leadership courted Third World liberation movements by 
engaging with international rights debates against racial discrimination. GDR foreign policy 
experts viewed such international rights activism as a new common anti-imperialist political 
language, which brought the East German leadership into direct contact with Third World 
countries and helped SED leaders to bridge the Second-Third World divide. 
 Apartheid took centre stage in this new East German strategy. From 1960 onwards, 
the GDR government educated ANC cadres and trained fighters as part of a large-scale 
reorientation of East German foreign policy towards Africa.6 With decolonization and the 
accession to United Nations (UN) membership of formerly colonised countries, the tables 
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within the UN seemingly began to turn in favour of the socialist bloc during the 1960s. This 
article traces how GDR legal and foreign policy experts developed a comprehensive legal 
language of national self-determination, anti-Apartheid, and eventually socialist human rights 
to demonstrate the moral superiority of the East German socialist state over its West German 
neighbour. By the mid-1980s, at the time of Tutu’s intervention into West German debates, 
this language of decolonisation and rights debates on self-determination had already been 
transformed into a conflict over human rights and economic development. 
 Traditional accounts of the rise of human rights root the breakthrough of human rights 
language largely in Western discourses. So far, the debate within human rights historiography 
remains concentrated on the breakthrough of human rights in the second half of the twentieth 
century based on a longue durée genealogy of human rights ideas since the French 
Revolution.7 By now, the pivotal role of Third World liberation movements in the rise of a 
language of national self-determination and the development of human rights discourses has 
been acknowledged.8 The role of the socialist bloc in these developments has not been given 
much attention. Yet, socialist bloc countries such as the GDR, as this article argues, played a 
crucial role in the dissemination of ideas and international legal norms of human rights.9  
Conflicts over racial discrimination, Apartheid, and the economic development of 
former colonies became a vehicle for international coalition building. Rights languages 
constructed around these conflicts underpinned efforts of the socialist bloc to forge a close 
alliance to former colonies against the Western Cold War coalition. In the crucial shifts in 
international law debates from the 1960s to the 70s, socialist bloc countries actively took part 
in supporting UN initiatives such as the anti-Apartheid convention, human rights language, 
and a right to development to bolster their alliances with Third World countries. Among 
them, the GDR government had a special stake in these rights debates. SED leaders tied their 
quest to gain international recognition for their state’s sovereignty and the political 
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legitimacy for their regime to these conflict-ridden discussions on the development of 
international law.  
 
The East German Discovery of the Third World 
 
In December 1960, the SED-mouthpiece Neues Deutschland ran an eight-page long front-
page article outlining the results of the latest debates on communist ideology. On page four of 
this lengthy piece on the progress of the socialist world revolution, the issue of Apartheid was 
introduced to East German readers. The SED leadership reacted to the adoption of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the UN 
General Assembly on 14 December. African nationalists and human rights activists had 
petitioned UN committees since the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 to end colonial rule in UN Trust Territories.10 The Algerian war and the 
Congo conflict had challenged Western definitions of humanitarian crises and international 
law.11 But it was the issue of Apartheid that quickly became a linguistic marker for racial 
inequality and attracted worldwide attention. With the independence of a growing number of 
colonies, decolonisation now moved to the centre of attention of SED-leaders as the most 
overt sign for an accelerated downfall of ‘the forces of Imperialism’.12  
This initial East German turn to rights activism centring on racial discrimination was 
briefly suspended only half a year later when the GDR regime shocked the Western world 
with the cementing of the German-German border. In the devastating months of summer 
1961, West Berlin major Willy Brandt tried to make the Berlin Wall a UN human rights 
issue. The language of human rights had remained at the fringes of West German politics 
despite the existence of various human rights groups since the late 1940s.13 Yet, the power of 
new Third World rights languages already showed internationally. Regardless of the 
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aggressive GDR move to close off West Berlin, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson and 
General Lucius D. Clay told Brandt in no uncertain terms that the US had no interest in 
opening a flank to socialist bloc governments for anti-colonial criticism at the UN. The Allies 
argued that the socialist bloc would most certainly try to distract from the building of the 
Berlin Wall by pointing to Western colonies if the Berlin issue would be taken to the UN 
General Assembly. After a brief phase of interest in Brandt’s idea, the British Foreign Office 
followed suit. In the end, French and British colonial interests prevented the Berlin issue 
from becoming a topic for the General Assembly.14 
 Despite this failure to involve the UN in protests against the Berlin wall, the Bonn 
government had successfully used Western majorities in emerging international bodies such 
as the UN since 1949. The SED leadership found its state cut off from international affairs 
due to a strict legal non-recognition policy, which the West German government had 
introduced into international affairs.15 The Hallstein Doctrine, which outlined that the Federal 
Republic viewed the international recognition of the GDR by third countries as ‘unfriendly 
act’ since the mid-1950s, curtailed the SED leadership even further. When the Yugoslavian 
government recognised the GDR as a sovereign state on 15 October 1957, West German 
threats of cutting diplomatic and economic ties with third countries that recognised East 
German statehood came to a head. The West German government had no other option than 
following through on its threats and severing official ties with Tito’s regime in response. 
Soon after, the second Berlin Crisis accelerated the conflict between the two German 
governments.16 As further successes towards universal recognition of GDR sovereignty 
within Europe seemed unlikely, the East Berlin leadership now looked beyond Europe in 
continuing its quest. This East German attempt to form official diplomatic and economic 
connections to Africa and Asia was thus closely tied to German-German politics 
(Deutschlandpolitik).  
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 Decolonisation fundamentally changed the parameters of German-German diplomatic 
conflicts. SED foreign policy experts suddenly discovered that forging an alliance with the 
emerging Third World could prove to be a way out of international isolation. East German 
foreign policy experts set their eyes on members of the non-alignment movement and 
decolonising states in Africa. By the end of the 1950s, the GDR had built a network of twenty 
public relations agents in Egypt, ten in Iraq, ten in Indonesia, eight in Burma, and thirty-five 
in India. Yet, the non-ideological economic West German approach to foreign policy outside 
of Europe in Africa and Asia left the East Germans without a rallying cause to break the 
superior economic position of the Federal Republic towards these countries.17 Racial 
discrimination and Apartheid finally provided a new rallying cause. In the years following 
1961, the East German state would put considerable resources into the attempt to bridge the 
Second-Third World divide.18 
 Western security agencies watched these East German efforts to reach out to the Third 
World with unease. NATO detected an East German ‘offensive in the Youth Field’ after 13 
August 1961. Only a month after East German army and work brigades had moved out to 
close off the German-German border, the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries in 
September 1961 accelerated this turn to Africa and Asia.19 As West German delegates 
reported at secret NATO Council meetings, the SED leadership began to ramp up its contacts 
to ‘Afro-Asian bloc students’ currently enrolled at East German universities. SED officials 
and Free German Youth (FdJ) functionaries had contacted the more than 2,000 African and 
Asian students currently studying in the GDR. 20 Yet, these SED efforts first backfired. 
The East Berlin government faced a minor diplomatic incident in response to the 
SED’s first attempt to convince African and Asian students to write petitions to their 
governments urging them to engage in negotiations over mutual recognition. The SED still 
focused on sovereignty in these first attempts to convince Third World students of its cause. 
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Party cadres had not fully considered how students from India and the United Arab Republic 
(UAR) would react to such demands in view of their home countries’ conflicts with Pakistan 
and Israel over state legitimacy and sovereignty. They should have known better as 
diplomatic contacts with India and the UAR had remained ambivalent since the late 1950s.21 
Indian and UAR students rallied other foreign students to reject the SED’s propaganda effort 
and complained about constant difficulties inflicted on students who were not members of 
communist parties in their home countries. The SED’s ill-considered strategy quickly led to 
violent disputes and riots at universities in Rostock, Halle, and Leipzig. When East German 
authorities withheld passports and exit visas of protesting students, quickly labelled 
‘agitators’, and arrested approximately 50 of them, foreign students petitioned the Soviet 
ambassador to intervene on their behalf. The Soviet representative refused with the 
explanation that the GDR was a sovereign country. Eventually, the UAR’s ambassador 
stationed in Poland visited Rostock, Leipzig, Halle, and East Berlin to reassure foreign 
students.22 First SED advances thus failed. East German propaganda clearly needed to 
change. 
  Despite these setbacks, GDR government agencies continued to agitate for the East 
German cause. They now attempted to recruit Third World students currently matriculated at 
West German universities. These activities had caught the attention of the West German press 
as an article in Die Welt by Rudolf Freund from 2 March 1962 showcased. In the eyes of the 
West Germans, the GDR’s Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa under the 
leadership of Horst Brasch and Gerhard Dengle as head of the State Secretariat for University 
Affairs co-ordinated this infiltration work. They reported directly to the SED Central 
Committee and the Africa Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Division for 
International Relations in the Free German Trade Union (FDGB), the Afro-Asian Division in 
  8 
the Ministry for Cultural Affairs, and to the Central Council of the FdJ.23 The West German 
press suspected an unfolding GDR plot against the Bonn government. 
 The East German state now combined efforts at home and abroad. The SED 
leadership dispatched delegations to Africa, trained African students and trade union 
members at universities at home, and prepared development aid relations. Brasch toured 
Africa and announced at official press conferences, such as in Cairo, that two sovereign 
German states existed. For the West Germans, the purpose of these activities was obvious. 
The GDR regime carefully selected African partners for ‘future infiltration of the countries 
concerned’.24 The Bonn government was anxious that the SED leadership could be successful 
in forging political ties to the Third World, which might undermine the West German 
Hallstein Doctrine. The West German Ministry for Economic Cooperation, founded on 24 
November 1961, therefore quickly experimented with the use of development aid as 
diplomatic leverage to keep African and Asian governments in need of economic assistance, 
financial aid, and credits in the West German Cold War camp.25  
To bolster the campaign to bridge the divide to Third World activists, East German 
experts had to find a different propaganda language. They turned to a new international 
strategy built on the idea of a people’s right to self-determination. In this move, anti-
Apartheid rights activism played a central role. This shift towards a new language of anti-
Apartheid, support for the independence of colonial peoples, and against racial discrimination 
seemed to remedy earlier East German mistakes. First ANC delegations visited the GDR as 
the SED leadership began to court South African communists through the Committee for 
Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa (later Solidarity Committee of the GDR). From 1961 
onwards, leading members of the ANC’s armed wing such as Satyandranath ‘Mac’ Maharaj 
trained in East Germany. The Stasi subsequently professionalised this training. From 1967 
onwards, the armed wing of the ANC including the later South African Minister of 
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Intelligence Services Ronnie Kasrils received training in propaganda and underground work, 
sabotage, and infiltration by Stasi officers, who also provided expertise to the ANC’s 
department of intelligence and security.26 In December 1963, Duma Nokwe as member of the 
Central Committee of the South-African Communist Party (SACP) and Secretary-General of 
the ANC and Moses Kotane, the Secretary-General of the SACP and Treasurer of the ANC, 
received a first large material aid donation from the GDR government. This high-level 
political contacts were accompanied by scholarships for South-African students, anti-
Apartheid rallies in the GDR, and continued public protests of the GDR leadership against 
Apartheid in the East German press.27 Underneath this rhetoric of solidarity, however, the 
experience of Africans living in the GDR remained conflicted.28 While thousands of ANC 
fighters and political activists were trained in a closed facility outside of Teterow in 
Mecklenburg until the 1980s,29 East German diplomats and legal experts developed new 
political languages to join the Third World camp in conflicts over Apartheid at the UN and 
attack the Bonn government. 
The Federal Republic in many ways offered an easy target. It was no accident that the 
West German government chose South Africa as the first African country to establish official 
diplomatic ties with after 1949. The West German Foreign Office, still staffed with many 
diplomats who had begun their careers in the Third Reich, treated Apartheid as an ‘internal 
affair’ of South Africa and reduced the West German contacts to a mere trade relationship.30 
Behind closed doors, West German diplomats explained their views less guarded. In 1959, 
the West German consul in Dakar Walter Reinhold told his colleagues at a meeting of West 
German diplomats that ‘the negro-African is simply indifferent towards individual freedom’. 
No-one disputed his views.31 Such racist sympathies with the Apartheid regime remained 
common in the Foreign Office until the 1960s. The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, in which 
the police shot 59 South Africans among them women and children, changed little in the 
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relationship between both states. Yet, it brought the issue of Apartheid for the first time to the 
attention of a wider West German public. Constant East German accusations that the Federal 
Republic supplied the South African state with weapons and the Bonn government’s 
insistence on retaining trade relations soon reinforced a negative image of West Germany 
among newly independent states in the 1960s. This made Apartheid an effective issue to 
advance the East German quest for international recognition in Africa.32     
After the dust on the building of the Berlin Wall had settled, the GDR Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs began to engage with the UN directly. In February 1964, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Georg Stibi sent a telegram to the president of the XX. Conference of the Human 
Rights Commission convened in New York.33 Human rights language had been firmly 
associated with anti-racial discrimination activism and decolonisation at this point.34 
Published for a domestic audience in Neues Deutschland and Neue Zeit, Stibi’s message to 
the UN delegates linked Apartheid directly to the crimes of the Nazi regime. The SED 
ideologues in the party leadership had decided that rights protests against Apartheid offered 
an opportunity to taint the West German government as still being dominated by old fascists. 
To make this claim credibly to African UN delegates, which was not too far from the truth in 
the early 1960s given the elite continuities from the Third Reich into the Federal Republic,35 
Stibi’s telegram declared that the South African Apartheid regime and ‘the withholding of 
human rights from millions of Africans, which rests on the direct application of Hitler-fascist 
racial laws’ still ran deeply in West German politics. In contrast, the GDR represented a law-
abiding state worthy of international recognition.36  
German-German politics underscored this appeal to the UN. The GDR government 
urged the UN Human Rights Commission to include a ban on fascist and neofascist 
organisation into the currently debated convention against racial discrimination. Aimed at the 
Bonn government, Stibi congratulated the commission on the inclusion of a duty to inform on 
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measures taken against racial discrimination into Article 10 of the convention draft. This 
provision could be exploited in pointing to personal and institutional continuities from the 
Third Reich to the Federal Republic. The SED leadership had already attacked Konrad 
Adenauer’s top-aid, the head of the Federal Chancellery Hans Globke, one year earlier for his 
involvement in the Nazi regime. The only roadblock to give the GDR leadership a chance to 
engage directly with international rights affairs at the UN remained the exclusion of non-
membership states from signing UN conventions. Attacks on West German politicians and 
leading members of society thus culminated in the publication of the infamous Brown Book 
listing former Nazi party members in high position in the Federal Republic, which Albert 
Norden as the chief SED-propagandist presented to the international press on 2 July 1965.37 
These new GDR advances into UN rights debates remained difficult to debunk for the Bonn 
government. 
 The West German government soon faced greater problems than East German 
telegrams. By January 1965, the SED leadership had convinced the Soviet Union and other 
socialist bloc countries to circulate East German policy statements within the UN.38 This 
marked the breach of the institutional barrier, the UN bureaucracy had built to prevent non-
member states from interfering with UN matters. The GDR’s first circulated statements 
continued to concentrate on Apartheid and racial discrimination. With the adoption of the UN 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination on 21 
December 1965, the international rights debates connected to decolonisation reached a new 
high. Since the affirmation of the right to self-determination and independence of colonial 
peoples in 1960, UN debates had moved on first to a declaration against all forms of racial 
discrimination signed on 20 November 1963. Now, the convention codified legal principles 
to prevent racial discrimination. As the GDR press did not fail to mention, this happened 
against the votes of the US, UK, Portugal, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The 
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GDR Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ernst Otto Schwabe used this opportunity to reiterate 
the GDR’s long-standing commitment to anti-Apartheid and anti-discrimination legislation. 
Referring to the telegram sent to the XX. Conference of the Human Rights Commission by 
Stibi in 1964, Schwabe renewed the charge against the Bonn government aiding ‘white 
racists and co-operation with colonial masters’.39 
 The SED leadership formed ever-closer ties with the Arab world in the same year. The 
Egyptian regime abandoned its cautious position towards the German-German conflict and in 
January 1965 invited Walter Ulbricht for an official visit. When the Bonn Foreign Office 
inquired whether this invitation equalled the diplomatic recognition of the GDR, General 
Nasser saw an opportunity to pressure the West German government. He claimed that 
Ulbricht’s visit would not immediately imply the official endorsement of Egyptian-East 
German diplomatic relations. Yet, his position could change quickly if the Federal Republic 
continued to export weapons to Israel. In response to this threat, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard 
decided to exchange ambassadors with Israel. In turn, the Egyptian government proclaimed it 
would rescind their diplomatic relations with the government in Bonn.40 Ulbricht meanwhile 
visited Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, and Sudan. 
Erhard’s rash response solidified Arab support for East German foreign policy agendas in the 
following months and years. The SED leadership now hoped that a coalition of African and 
Arab states might swing the voting balance in the General Assembly to support for East 
German sovereignty in the UN.   
 The year 1966 marked a watershed date in UN affairs. With the opening of the human 
rights covenants for signature, new forms of human rights language began to overtake the 
UN’s focus on national self-determination, sovereignty, and racial discrimination. In this 
transition phase between the mid-1960s and late 1970s, when the human rights conventions 
took effect in 1976, the GDR leadership merged its own agenda of international recognition 
  13 
as a sovereign state with Third World demands. This was reflected in the GDR government’s 
official application for UN membership. Dated 28 February 1966, Walter Ulbricht petitioned 
the UN Secretary-General Thant to support the admission of the GDR as a sovereign country. 
The text of the application, based on the assumption that two sovereign German states 
separated by ideology had come into existence in 1949, drew legitimacy from constant East 
German support for the independence of colonial peoples, anti-racial discrimination 
legislation, and debates over nuclear disarmament.41 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy 
experts attempted to address the rights catalogue of their African allies front and centre.  
 
‘It should also be mentioned that the German Democratic Republic, proceeding from the 
resolution of the General Assembly and the decisions of the Security Council on the apartheid 
policy of the Republic of South Africa, broke off all trade and shipping relations with the 
Republic of South Africa as early as June 1963 and has most resolutely condemned the policy 
of apartheid. Similarly, on 12 November 1965, the Government of the German Democratic 
Republic most sharply denounced the illegal seizing of power of the racist regime in 
Rhodesia, backing the decisions of the United Nations Organisation on this matter.’42  
 
Emphasising GDR compliance with UN conventions, the SED leadership clearly hoped that 
African states together with the socialist bloc countries would make its case for membership 
in the corridors of the UN headquarters in New York and Geneva from now on. 
 For domestic audiences, the SED staged a debate of its UN membership application in 
the People’s Chamber soon after on 17 March 1966. The language of human rights occupied 
a prominent place in statements made by leading party members. Herman Axen, the editor-in-
chief of Neues Deutschland until 1966 and leading party expert on international relations, 
based his public support for Ulbricht’s UN application on the assertion that the socialist East 
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German state had already realised human rights for its citizens. Immediately following this 
statement, Axen turned to the GDR’s endorsement of the right of self-determination of 
colonies and anti-Apartheid activism. He used these two main themes to discredit the Bonn 
government.  
 Axen laid bare the immense difficulties of the West German government to engage 
with UN debates. Since 1949, the raison d’état of the Bonn Republic rested on the 
assumption that the sovereignty of the German Reich continued to exist after the end of the 
Second World War. This argument had facilitated a non-recognition policy of the GDR under 
international law during the 1950s.43 Yet, decolonisation fundamentally transformed the legal 
parameters of sovereignty and self-determination from 1960 onwards. What used to be seen 
as a contest over the legal representation of German sovereignty by the international 
community now appeared to a growing number of international observers as a West German 
‘intervention into internal affairs’ of the GDR.  
Combined with the continued West German trade relations to South Africa, Axen 
forged a powerful argument against the Federal Republic within the UN.44 He accused the 
Bonn government of being part of a Western coalition which obstructed the abolition of 
Apartheid. Only months after the GDR’s application for UN membership, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) failed to in a rule against South Africa’s expansion of Apartheid laws to 
South West Africa. In a split decision of seven against seven judges, the ICJ’s president Sir 
Percy Spender’s (Australia) casting vote overruled seven judges including the court’s vice-
president Wellington Koo (Republic of China), Vladimir M. Koretsky (USSR), Kotaro 
Tanaka (Japan), Philip C. Jessup (US), Luis Padilla-Nervo (Mexico), Isaac Forster (Senegal), 
and ad-hoc judge Sir Louis Mbanefo (Eastern Nigeria).45 The ICJ’s failure to oppose the 
expansion of Apartheid and enforce UN Trust Territory rules further fuelled the GDR 
government’s campaign in establishing direct ideological links to African socialist parties. 
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From Apartheid to Socialist Human Rights and Ostpolitik 
 
For 1968, UNESCO announced an International Year of Human Rights. The UNESCO 
Courier’s January issue prominently introduced this theme to a wide international readership. 
René Cassin, hailed as the author of its first draft, explained the origins of the Declaration of 
Human Rights to readers.46 UNESCO’s public relations efforts were meant to draw attention 
of the global public to the human rights covenants. Later in the year, a large conference 
should mark the peak of these UNESCO activities. In an ironic twist, this international 
congress was scheduled to take place in Tehran. The Shah’s country seemed an unlikely 
choice for this prominent international meeting. The conference quickly descended into open 
ideological conflict. Against the UN’s intention, the first UN-led world congress on human 
rights thus exposed the absence of international institutions to enforce UN conventions.47 The 
only issue, which merited widespread consensus amongst delegates at Teheran, remained the 
human rights situation in Southern Africa.  
 Debates at Teheran showed that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples from 1960 had been insufficient to end Apartheid. The 
demand for a UN convention condemning the crime of Apartheid grew louder. It resulted in 
an important shift in UN discussions during the 1968 human rights conference: the 
establishment of a link between international human rights norms and humanitarian law.48 
This change in emphasis of UN debates came to the fore after the long struggle over the 
drafting of the human rights covenants had reached its end. At the same time, decolonised 
states pushed for a continued emphasis on human rights after they had gained independence 
and secured their national self-determination. This Third World rights diplomacy reached new 
  16 
heights at the Tehran conference.49 The GDR consequently had to adapt the emphasis of its 
rights diplomacy with Third World countries in the late 1960s.  
Human rights now began to overtake the right of self-determination and anti-
Apartheid protests in East German propaganda. Hermann Klenner had put forward the first 
significant theoretical treatment of socialist human rights in the GDR in 1964. Socialist 
human rights, following Klenner, were secured by active participation of the East German 
citizen in socialist society. Klenner posited that the social and economic order of the GDR 
secured human rights for its citizens through its mere existence.50 In the years from 1964 to 
1968, the SED leadership oversaw a large-scale legal reform era. East German governmental 
experts drafted a new citizenship law, criminal code, and constitution in this period. This turn 
to socialist legality at home marked an ideological turnaround. In April 1958, party leaders 
had infamously demanded the primacy of the party over law and control over the legal 
profession at the Babelsberg Conference.51 By the late 1960s, the domestic return to socialist 
legality merged with East German UN rights propaganda. Armed with this new legal 
language, and heavily drawing on the now well-established demands for a right of self-
determination, anti-Apartheid activism, and socialist human rights, the GDR government sent 
envoys to the Tehran conference.52   
 The year 1968 marked the beginning of East German propaganda efforts to popularise 
the SED’s demand for the recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state based on socialist 
legality. In April 1968, the SED politburo discussed the ‘worldwide campaign for the 
popularisation of the socialist constitution of the GDR’ alongside the official statement of the 
GDR government to the Tehran human rights conference. The initial GDR campaign to 
connect to African and Asian states via a shared advocacy of self-determination and anti-
Apartheid now transformed into a rights language guided by socialist human rights and 
constitutionalism. The goal, however, remained the same. The SED leadership planned to 
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rally enough Third World and socialist bloc countries behind its demand of being recognised 
internationally as a fully sovereign state. The politburo ordered that the GDR constitution 
draft was sent to foreign governments, parliaments, UN bodies, and socialist parties to 
promote this new agenda. Dedicating a 5, 10, and 25 Pfennig stamp to the International Year 
of Human Rights, East German mail was supposed to carry the SED’s human rights pledge 
into the world. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was tasked with drafting a declaration to the 
Tehran conference which took the socialist constitution as the basis and benchmark to discuss 
the human rights situation in both German states. SED ideologues hoped to discredit further 
the West German government’s ongoing effort to implement emergency laws as a return to 
‘fascist’ practices by promoting socialist rights.53 Despite the rhetoric of connecting to the 
Third World, and Africa in particular, the West German state remained the main target of 
these SED efforts. 
 However, the GDR government’s official statement to the international human rights 
conference in Tehran struck a different cord. The document opened with the East German 
government expressing the hope that the conference would contribute to the global 
implementation of human rights. Based on its previous engagement with UN rights debates, 
the GDR leadership pledged that the socialist Germany would immediately accede to UN 
conventions on the rights of self-determination of colonial peoples, the anti-racial 
discrimination convention, and affirmed its ‘willingness of a constructive cooperation with 
activities of the UN in the field of human rights’. The declaration then went on to argue for a 
direct link between socialist constitutionalism and human rights. In the eyes of the SED, the 
drafting of a new GDR constitution in fact manifested the main East German contribution to 
the International Year of Human Rights. The turn to socialist constitutionalism in fact SED 
had already secured human rights in the GDR in the eyes of the SED leadership.  
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 Underneath this confident rhetoric, the GDR government tried to conceal its own 
rights violations. The text then ran through the issues currently debated within the UN: the 
right of self-determination, the protection of international peace with reference to the 
Vietnam War, Apartheid, and the regime in Rhodesia, the prosecution of war crimes, and the 
manifestation of human rights in the basic rights provisions of the GDR constitution. The 
guarantee of free movement, which the SED claimed was secured according to the human 
rights covenants in domestic legislation, led the GDR regime’s legal experts on ever-thinner 
ice.54 Since the proclamation of the GDR citizenship law in 1967, the SED regime tied the 
right to free movement and rescinding GDR citizenship to state approval.55 While this 
provision consequently only merited one small paragraph in the GDR memorandum, SED 
foreign policy experts hoped to distract from the curtailing of free movement by 
concentrating on social rights such as a right to education and work. The last passages of the 
GDR’s message to the Tehran delegates returned to the special German responsibility to 
respect the territorial integrity of states - a concern very much shared by Third World 
countries - and painted the Federal Republic as being in open violation of these international 
legal norms. The GDR depicted West German police violence, emergency law legislation, 
and the suppression of communists in the Federal Republic in analogy to the experience of 
South Africans and other members of liberation movements in the attempt to garner further 
support for the East German position on state sovereignty.56       
 From 1968 to 1973, GDR’s Third World agenda facilitated growing support within the 
UN for East German membership.57 The SED regime actively supported the anti-Apartheid 
struggle and organised the printing of the ANC’s main press organs Sechaba and ANC Speaks 
by the East German Erich Weinert publishing house.58 The Federal Republic’s reluctance to 
cut off economic and trade relations with the South African state in compliance with UN 
resolutions opened up the Bonn government to constant East German propaganda attacks. 
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This did not change with the conclusion of Ostpolitik treaty negotiations in 1972.59 Once the 
two German states had ratified the Basic Treaty, which normalised their bilateral relations, 
their diplomatic battle moved to the hallways of the UN. The Bonn government’s fear of a 
communist take-over under the ANC and vested economic interests continued to hamper the 
Federal Republic’s attempts to counter the GDR’s anti-Apartheid agenda.60  
 When the voting balance in the General Assembly tilted in favour of the socialist bloc 
and Third World countries, the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid finally passed in the General Assembly on 30 November 1973. Alongside other 
Western countries, the West German UN representative Dietrich von Kyaw abstained from 
the vote on behalf of the Federal Republic. In his brief statement of about one minute during 
the conclusion of the discussion on the draft convention on 26 October 1973, Kyaw 
stressed chancellor Willy Brandt’s condemnation of colonialism and racial 
discrimination. Brandt had made this point during his speech before the twenty-
eighth General Assembly. Kyaw highlighted existing domestic legislation that 
ensured compliance with UN legal norms. The Federal Republic had ratified the 
genocide and anti-racial discrimination conventions. Yet, due to ‘unresolved legal 
problems’, the West German government had to ‘generally abstain’ from the vote.61 
 The convention put Western countries into a difficult position. The draft 
convention dubbed Apartheid a crime against humanity and demanded a new 
international prosecution regime. Perpetrators against the convention’s terms should 
be prosecuted worldwide. For many Western legal experts, the convention thus 
raised fundamental problems of international criminal law. The US representative 
Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. made Western concerns plain in in the final debate on the draft 
convention on 30 November 1973. The rights regime demanded by the Apartheid convention 
called for the authority of the UN’s Human Rights Committee to override the sovereign 
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powers of national governments over their domestic jurisdiction. Ferguson demanded a return 
to the Nuremberg Tribunal’s legal principles in prosecuting crimes against humanity. Only 
the ‘clearly defined’ Nuremberg regulations seemed appropriate in the eyes of the US 
delegation in prosecuting Apartheid. The convention to outlaw racial discrimination, which 
explicitly referenced Apartheid, would moreover cover all necessary legal provisions to fight 
Apartheid. In short, there was no need for a separate convention. 
 Ferguson continued with arguing that the demanded enlargement of a global 
jurisdiction regime undercut the legal safeguards of citizens travelling outside their home 
countries. In contrast to Kyaw’s brief and abstract statement, Ferguson chose to expand on 
concrete legal scenarios to showcase the transformation of global rights regimes outlined in 
the convention. ‘We do not for example accept that an American citizen vacationing in 
a foreign country could be extradited to another foreign country and tried in that third 
foreign country for something that he has said on the territory of the United States. A 
result which would flow quite clearly from the provisions of this convention.’ While the 
Apartheid convention called for an enlargement of the human rights regime, ‘the 
elaboration of rules for the protection of human rights cannot be done in such a 
manner as to ignore the very fabric of the rules of law. Efforts to protect human 
rights, Ferguson closed, which ignore the rule of law can only lead to chaos’.62 As 
the Apartheid convention marked ‘a step backwards to the protection of the 
individual’, the US delegation did not just abstain from the vote, but voted no.63 The 
British representative  Mackenzie changed the UK’s vote to no in the eleventh hour 
citing the same legal concerns.64 The Bonn government in particular had some 
recent experience with such unwanted legal prosecution of its citizens by another 
country. Since 1967, the GDR had levelled its new citizenship law against former 
GDR citizens who had fled the country after 1949. The new law threatened to 
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repatriate them against their will.65 For Western governments, the preservation of 
national sovereignty trumped international legal norms once again. 
 The GDR won another propaganda victory along with socialist states and 
members of the Asian-African bloc by passing the Apartheid convention on 30 
November 1973. While most of these governments had no intention to relinquish any 
part of their national sovereignty - the socialist bloc countries actually pushed very 
hard for the territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs as part of the 
emerging Helsinki Accords negotiations -,66 East German media could once more 
paint the Federal Republic as part of a still-exiting fascist alliance. The SED 
leadership decided to accede to the convention for this purpose. On 18 August 1974, 
the GDR joined the Apartheid convention, which was scheduled to take legal effect 
on 18 July 1976. The Federal Republic conversely never signed the convention due 
to the concerns over the transformation of the international criminal law regime 
outlined in its articles.  
Apartheid thus remained a frequent topic in East German domestic media as 
it offered the possibility to criticise the West German government, which had only 
acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination on 15 June 1969. Consequently, articles on Apartheid and the UN 
convention reached a new high in East German newspapers such as Neues 
Deutschland, Neue Zeit, and Berliner Zeitung during the years 1973 and 1974. The 
GDR’s Committee for Human Rights continued to tout the party line and followed the 
shift from interpreting Apartheid as a matter of self-determination to a human rights 
issue.67 Until 1989, East German state media reported frequently on the crimes of the 
Apartheid regime. 
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From Rights to Aid: East German UN politics in the 1980s 
 
The battle for influence in developing countries continued after the UN admission of both 
German states in 1973. Hermann Klenner went on to tour the globe promoting the East 
German version of human rights. With the end of the Ulbricht era in 1971, East German legal 
scholars like Klenner, who had been singled out and severely attacked by Ulbricht at the 
Babelsberg Conference in 1958, were again allowed to discuss the nature of law more 
independently from Ulbricht’s dogma of the party’s primacy over law. In Klenner’s work on 
human rights, the right of self-determination lost its once central place.68 While Klenner 
returned to philosophical aspects of human rights law and discussed them at international 
venues such as the World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy,69 a new 
generation of West German legal scholars and judges such as Martin Kriele realised that the 
legal profession in the Federal Republic needed an answer to the GDR’s international rights 
language. Early on in his academic career, Kriele pushed for a much more open academic 
debate on the political nature of law. He acted as one of the legal experts for the federal 
government in the case against the Basic Treaty between the two German states brought 
before the West German Federal Constitutional Court by the Bavarian government, and went 
on to serve as judge on the bench of the Constitutional Court of North Rhine Westphalia.70 In 
1977, Kriele published a critical appraisal of the German-German competition over human 
rights, in which he hoped to expose the hypocrisy of East German international law 
propaganda.  
 Kriele diagnosed a growing tendency among West German politicians, parties, and 
NGOs of reducing the human rights debate to a political language game. He criticised a 
conflation of socialist and Western understandings in international debates on human rights 
after the Helsinki Accord negotiations had been concluded in 1975. The shared semantics of 
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human rights had blurred crucial political and ideological differences in the legal 
manifestations of human rights in both German states. Kriele called for a determined 
exposure of the rights violations in everyday East German legal culture. This return to legal 
realities in the GDR should discredit the SED’s international legal politics.  
A conflation of human rights languages of individual and collective rights concepts 
had indeed occurred since the early 1970s. In 1972, Kéba Mbaye first suggested that a right 
to development constituted a human right. Mbaye, at the time a member of the UN Human 
Rights Commission, served as president of the Senegalese Supreme Court and the ICJ. From 
a perspective of decolonised states, the right to development should entail economic and 
financial compensation of former colonial powers. Developing countries hoped that such a 
right would overcome the historically inbuilt inequalities of the UN Charter and Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and ensure their economic self-determination. The demand for 
reparations for colonialism led to an immediate Western rejection of the very existence of any 
right to development. Beyond this post-colonial conflict, the right to development proposed a 
link between civil and political with social and economic rights. Mbaye’s idea demanded 
nothing less than the merging of the two human rights covenants.71 
The emerging debate on a human right to development again conflated discussions 
over individual civil and political rights and collective norms such as self-determination and 
national rights to economic development. With this shift, as Kriele had argued, East German 
rights language towards African and Asian countries was changing in nature. By the late 
1970s, he saw the main attraction for Third World leaders to engage with socialist visions of 
human rights and international law in their assumption that only a socialist economic order 
could facilitate the end of hunger in former colonial countries.72 Crisis-ridden Western 
economies and the accelerated financial demands on developing states by Western countries 
increased the attraction of socialist economic visions to overcome the development crisis of 
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decolonised states through ‘solidarity rights’.73 Kriele predicted a diplomatic shift in the 
relations between the GDR and African and Asian countries. He believed that ideology and 
socialist rights language stood at the beginning of the East German encounter of the Third 
World. Economic development and aid, Kriele concluded, would structure the political 
language of leading SED officials in the 1980s.74 
 This shift in GDR rhetoric to ‘development’ as a guiding paradigm had initially been 
forced by the competition for ideological leadership among socialist countries. Since the 
Sino-Soviet split, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) made inroads into Africa. Mao’s 
accusation of social imperialism against the Soviet Union was accompanied by the linkage of 
race and ideology in his appeal to African countries. Soon, the SED leadership had to defend 
itself against Chinese accusations as well.75 The PRC’s Third World campaign poisoned the 
relationship of many socialist countries to Africa from the mid-1960s onwards. The Chinese 
model of development attracted more and more attention and seemed much closer to African 
needs than Eastern European visions of socialist modernity and economic development. The 
PRC’s campaign culminated in Deng Xiaoping’s famous speech before the UN General 
Assembly in 1974, when he announced the Three-World theory. This ideological competition 
within the socialist camp put the SED ideologically under pressure.76 
  Non-aligned visions of a New International Economic Order, Chinese Three-World 
rhetoric, and Western debates on development converged with human rights language from 
the mid-1970s onwards. After the proclamation of the anti-Apartheid convention in 1973, 
questions of economic and social development began to overtake rights conflicts tied to racial 
discrimination. The SED leadership had difficulties adapting to this shift and continued to 
concentrate on Apartheid. The GDR government hosted the Anti-Apartheid Conference in 
1974 and ran a publicity campaign to mark the UN’s International Anti-Apartheid Year in 
1978.77 Underneath this rights language, the GDR government’s support for the ANC and the 
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South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) turned more and more into a military 
alliance. By 1980, South African sources reported that GDR military instructors were killed 
during raids of insurgency camps in Angola and rumours persisted that an East German 
parachute battalion operated out of a base in South Angola. The GDR turned into the key-
player together with Cuban and Soviet officers in helping military insurgency groups to pose 
a credible military threat to South Africa.78 
East German diplomats simultaneously attempted to remain in line with ongoing 
Third World legal debates. The individual and collective right to development rose to 
prominence as part of contentious global debates on economic justice. Western governments 
denied any existence of a collective right to development. There may existed moral 
obligations for aid, but Western leaders were very clear that they rejected any legal 
obligations. Yet, the two-third majority of developing countries in the UN’s Commission on 
Human Rights since ECOSOC’s expansion in 1967 allowed for the passing of a Charter on 
the Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974.79 On 10 February 1975, only months 
before the Helsinki Accords were signed, the UN Human Right Commission officially 
adopted the right to development to its agenda. The right to development now structured 
much of the rights controversies within the UN. 
The US human rights offensive was a major component in the push-back against non-
aligned efforts to pass a binding UN resolution on a collective right to development.80 
Western countries and especially the US administration put a new spin on the right to 
development. For them, such a right described the right of citizens to democratic 
participation. Otherwise, Western leaders feared, their understanding of a human rights 
regime focused on individual rights might collapse. In response, the Organisation of African 
Unity (later the African Union) enshrined an individual and collective right to development 
into the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981. African states followed the 
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example of the European and American Convention on Human Rights and established a 
regional human rights regime. The Chinese turn to Deng’s policies of economic reform and 
opening since 1978 simultaneously allowed for renewed alliances between the socialist bloc 
and developing countries in the struggle for the recognition of a legal right to development at 
the turn to the 1980s. 
Military, educational, and medical assistance redirected the SED’s focus in its official 
human rights language by the 1980s. In 1982, the East German Deputy Foreign Minister 
Harry Ott boasted about the successes of East German support for developing countries and 
national liberation movements in a conversation with UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de 
Cuellar. He rooted this success no longer in questions of national sovereignty and self-
determination, but in the fight for a new structure of the global economy. The rhetoric 
developed in the 1960s had nonetheless not entirely vanished. The GDR, Ott remarked, 
actively assisted ‘developing countries in their striving to rid themselves ultimately and 
completely from all forms of dependence, to overcome unjust division of labour bequeathed 
by colonialism, and to counteract neo-colonialist practices. Full equality of rights, respect of 
sovereignty, non-discrimination, mutual benefit and non-interference in internal affairs are 
the principles that distinguish the GDR’s relations with developing countries’.81 Ott 
mechanically summarised here the milestone conventions, the GDR regime had engaged with 
in its campaign to be internationally recognised as a sovereign state.  
 Yet, what Ott really wanted to stress was GDR development aid. This was the real 
shift in emphasis underneath a well-rehearsed rhetoric of self-determination. The German-
German development aid race had already begun in the 1960s, yet it only began to dominate 
East German UN language by the 1980s.82 The East German budget for these tasks had risen 
to more than 1.5 billion marks by 1981. This still only remained a fraction of West German 
financial power. At the time, a sizable part of this East German aid went to South African 
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groups. In 1978, the ANC, SWAPO, and other anti-Apartheid organisations had received 40-
50 million marks worth of ‘solidarity donations’. These funds allowed for vocational training 
of South Africans, medical treatment of ANC and SWAPO fighters in East German hospitals, 
military assistance and weapons, and ideological training.83 
Ott tried to distract from this fact by focussing on the education sector to prove East 
German accomplishments. In 1981, another 12,827 persons from across Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia had been trained at East German universities and technical schools. The 
GDR helped with the training of ‘national cadres’ to ensure developing countries’ 
independence in ‘determining their own political destiny’. Since 1970, this effort had brought 
the total number of cadres from such countries trained in the GDR to over 50,000. At the 
same time, 954 GDR experts - economists, medical doctors, engineers, teachers, and 
vocational instructors - were stationed in developing countries in 1981.  
In contrast to Western powers, Ott stressed, the GDR would not encourage a brain 
drain from developing countries, but rather help in their economic and social development. 
750 projects in developing countries had been completed while another 67 project were 
underway. These projects had covered plant and equipment transport, communications, 
electrification, building materials, installations for livestock breeding, farm product 
processing, equipment for hospitals, schools and universities.84 Ott hoped these figures would 
impress the incoming new Secretary-General Cuellar. Yet, the days of major East German 
successes in the UN had long passed. In the game of financial developing aid, the GDR 
simply could not compete by the 1980s. 
Until 1986, UN bodies went to work and argued over the scope and content of a new 
convention on a right to development. As Western countries held all the chips in international 
financial and economic organisations, the eventual non-binding declaration draft included ten 
contradictory articles. On 4 December 1986, Resolution 41/128 passed in the General 
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Assembly. The Declaration on the Right to Development enshrined in Article 1 ‘an 
inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to 
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development’. 
This right should encompass ‘the full realisation of the right of peoples to self-determination, 
which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human 
Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth 
and resources.’85 Yet, none of this was a legal right and thus not enforceable. 
The debate on the right to development allowed for the continuation of conflicts over 
decolonisation on a new plane and opened new spaces to put human rights at the centre of 
economic debates. The declaration included language, the East German leadership could still 
very much identify with as it stressed their key-concerns of sovereignty and the protection of 
internal affairs that had guided SED approaches to UN politics from the 1960s onwards. Yet, 
the inability of the coalition between the socialist bloc and developing countries to introduce 
a link between development and human rights as a legal right, as Mbaye had envisaged, 
allowed for little more than a publicity success. The West German abstention from the vote 
on the declaration – together with Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and the 
UK – and the US vote in opposition against an overwhelming majority of 146 states once 
more symbolically put the GDR on the right side of an international law debate.86 Yet, 
growing protests at home soon turned rights languages against the SED regime in the late 
1980s and helped formulate a fundamental critique of the political situation within the GDR, 
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International rights languages formed an important part of the SED’s foreign policy and 
international public relation campaigns. From the days of East German anti-Apartheid and 
national self-determination rhetoric in the 1960s, the German-German competition for 
influence in the Third World moved away from legal rights languages towards economic 
rights and development aid. In this process, the Federal Republic recaptured political 
influence in Africa and Asia through economic aid policies by the 1980s, which had shortly 
been jeopardised by the GDR’s rights campaigns against Apartheid and for national 
sovereignty in the late 1960s and early 1970s. With the admission of both German states to 
the UN in 1973, the German-German competition over international legal legitimacy returned 
to a focus on the domestic political systems of both states in the relations between the two 
German governments. At the same time, the SED’s continued engagement with international 
rights debates could not stop the growing discontent within East German society in the 1980s 
and ultimately failed to lend the regime renewed legitimacy at home. 
The GDR’s international rights activism via socialist brother states – which submitted 
East German policy papers to the General Assembly long before official GDR membership in 
1973 – showcases how Third World revolutionary agendas of national self-determination and 
against racial discrimination also reshaped European Cold War debates.87 The long-term 
conflicts over the drafting of an UN Apartheid Convention, which eventually was adopted on 
23 October 1973, a month after both German states had gained full UN membership, fostered 
East German ties to African and Asian states. Together with the GDR’s international human 
rights offensive, socialist leaders in East Berlin were finally able to create sufficient pressure 
to attack the West German Hallstein Doctrine. UN rights discourses therefore served East 
Germany better than the Federal Republic in the late 1960s and early 70s. At least in the case 
of Cold War Germany, international rights languages centred on self-determination, 
Apartheid and racial discrimination, and human rights had their public breakthrough largely 
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due to socialist initiative. With German unification in 1990, the history of international 
socialist rights languages was no longer given much attention when GDR historiography was 
engulfed in heated debates on the nature of the East German Unrechtsstaat.88 If we want to 
understand the genesis of post-Cold War conflicts over human rights, however, it remains 
important to recover state-mandated socialist rights activism during the Cold War and its 
impact on international legal developments. 
The adoption of the Helsinki Accords forced both German governments to engage in a 
new inward-looking battle over the question which political system was better suited to 
implement and adhere to UN human rights norms. Yet, there was no immediate ‘Helsinki 
effect’ in the GDR.89 This was due to the fact that socialist governments did not merely 
accepted new international legal norms in the 1960s and 70s, but took an active part in 
shaping human rights language. West German legal politics still structured by the idea that 
the German Reich’s sovereignty continued to exist, the US government’s stern opposition to 
any social and economic human rights such as a right to development, and a rights talk 
offensive across the socialist bloc postponed the subversive effects of human rights language 
in the GDR.90 The intense state-led turn to international legal vocabulary only turned against 
the SED regime in the mid-1980s, when East German dissidents began to criticise the 
government more and more confidently. Once Eastern European dissidents such as Vaclav 
Havel had provided a language to attack socialist legality at home, the SED leadership had 
ever-greater difficulties to legitimise its rule in the accelerating economic crisis of state 
socialism in the 1980s.91 By the late 1980s, the days of confident state-led East German 
rights activism on behalf of South Africans, against racial discrimination, and for socialist 
human rights were long gone. It was nonetheless this East German state-led propaganda 
effort from the 1960s onwards that introduced international rights languages as a major field 
of ideological conflict to German-German Cold War politics. 
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